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The South African Constitutional Court  
and the unborn
Shaun de Freitas1
Abstract
The South African Constitutional Court has not yet been confronted with having to 
make a finding on the status of the unborn against the background of the South 
African Bill of Rights. Expecting that the Constitutional Court will sometime in the 
future be approached in this regard, this article presents some preparatory foun-
dational insights on what the approach of the said Court should be. In this regard, 
the law-making function of the judiciary and the importance of an informative and 
rational approach towards the protection of the unborn in the judicial process are 
emphasised. A more nuanced approach by the judiciary towards the status of the 
unborn will provide more sensitivity towards matters which overlap with the practice 
of religion on the one hand and the protection of the unborn on the other. Exam-
ples in this regard are conscientious objections by medical practitioners against 
partaking in abortions due to their religious beliefs, and the dissemination of ethical 
or jurisprudential knowledge of the unborn to students in secular institutions of 
education who, in accordance with their religious beliefs, oppose the termination of 
the unborn. Religious institutions which oppose abortions will also be obligated by 
their own tenets to form part of such a judicial process, and this is allowed for by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa.
Keywords  Abortion, unborn, right to life, abortion and the judiciary, the right to life 
and the courts, the right to life and the South African Constitution.
Introduction1. 
In South Africa, the recognition of the unborn2 has yet to be addressed at the highest 
national level of judicial scrutiny – whilst the highest courts of many other states 
with strong human rights jurisprudence such as America, Canada and Germany 
have already had dealings with the issue. The South African Choice on Termina-
1 Shaun de Freitas (*1970) is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of the Free State, South 
Africa. His legal speciality is religious rights and freedoms. Article received: 7 June 2012; Accepted: 
29 December 2012. The article uses British English. Contact: Department of Constitutional Law and 
Philosophy of Law, Faculty of Law, PO Box 339, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, 9300, 
South Africa. E-mail: defreitas@ufs.ac.za.
2 In this article, “unborn“ refers to the “entity“ formed at fertilisation and continuing until birth, while 
“fertilisation” refers to the union of ovum and sperm.
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tion of Pregnancy Act3 basically allows for abortion on demand any time during 
approximately the first 20 weeks of pregnancy and in the words of John Smyth 
(2006:228), “most clinics, government and private, regard any abortion under 20 
weeks as ‘on demand’ and most ignore the requirement that a doctor must assist 
the mother to make the decision.” The High Court judgment (more than a decade 
ago) of Christian Lawyers Association of Southern Africa v� Minister of Health 
and Others4 is the only “leading authority” for South African jurisprudence in this 
regard.5 This judgment, says Tjakie Naudé (1999:547), failed to consider whether 
section 12(2)(a) of the South African Constitution6 creates a constitutional right to 
have an abortion on demand up to the moment before birth, or only a “qualified” 
right to have an abortion on certain grounds and up to a certain stage of foetal 
development.7
In a democratic and constitutional dispensation aspiring to the furtherance of 
human rights application, South African jurisprudence on a fundamental matter 
such as the legal status of the unborn in the context of the South African Constitu-
tion, still has much to aspire towards. Bearing in mind that to date the South African 
Constitutional Court has not been approached in this regard, it is important that 
preparatory discussion on this issue be presented. Consequently, this article calls 
for having the Constitutional Court assist in gaining more clarity on the legal status 
of the unborn against the background of a more improved degree of legal recogni-
tion. In this regard, support is given to the role of the South African Constitutional 
Court in approaching the legal status of the unborn from a more nuanced and 
sensitive point of view, bearing in mind that the woman’s right to have an abortion 
should be qualified against the background of the interests of the unborn as well.8 
3 92 of 1996.
4 1998 (4) SA 1113. Hereafter referred to as the “CLA-judgment“.
5 For criticism on the said judgment, see Tjakie Naudé 1999:541-563 and S.A. de Freitas 2005:124 
and 126-141. 
6 Which reads: “Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right 
to make decisions concerning reproduction”. This represents the often referred to “pro-choice“ view, 
which proclaims that the pregnant mother should have the freedom to make her own choices pertai-
ning to matters related to her body.
7 Henk Botha (2009:210) comments against the background of bearers of human dignity in South 
Africa, that Christian Lawyers Association of SA v. Minister of Health, “although it makes sense of the 
prominence afforded in the 1996 Constitution to reproductive freedom, it can be faulted for its forma-
lism and its refusal to engage fundamental ethical issues raised by the legalisation of abortion”.
8 The following view by Tjakie Naudé (1999:551) is therefore supported: “A contextual approach should 
not allow a court interpreting the right to life to look at the right to bodily integrity, freedom, equality, 
human dignity and privacy of pregnant women only, whilst leaving the object of the right to life out of 
consideration.” In this regard Naudé (1999:553) states: “Is the outcome intended by 12(2)(a) really 
that foetal life is not protected by the constitution, so that a woman has a constitutional right to have 
an abortion on demand up to the moment of birth? This would mean that legislation encouraging the 
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More specifically this article firstly postulates the importance of the “law-making 
function” of the judiciary in such contentious and complex issues, together with an 
emphasis on the responsibility of the judiciary to provide for an inclusive, impartial 
and informative decision-making process. In this regard, the reader is reminded of 
the important role that civil society, especially religious associations, may play in the 
judicial process. Secondly, the role of science and the recognition of the inherent 
value of the unborn in assisting the judiciary in such a matter is presented.
The unborn and the judiciary2. 
Most liberal democracies, according to Michael Perry (2007:88), empower their 
judiciaries to enforce their constitutional law of human rights. This implies that 
the judiciary gains in its law-making authority, Perry (2007:90) stating that “[m]
ost entrenched human rights are indeterminate in the context of many of the cases 
in which they are invoked. Consequently, in protecting entrenched human rights, 
courts are often in the position of ‘making’ law … .” This certainly applies to the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. In S v� Williams the South African Constitu-
tional Court stated:
Courts do have a role to play in the promotion and development of a new culture 
“founded on the recognition of human rights”, in particular, with regard to those 
rights which are enshrined in the Constitution. It is a role which demands that a 
court should be particularly sensitive to the impact which the exercise of judicial 
functions may have on the rights of individuals who appear before them; vigilance 
is an integral component of this role, for it is incumbent on structures set up to 
administer justice to ensure that as far as possible, these rights, particularly of the 
weakest and the most vulnerable, are defended and not ignored.9
Ronald Dworkin (cited in Dellapenna 2006:1095) postulates that the quality of pub-
lic debate is higher, more focused, and more extensive when the decision is to be 
rendered by a court rather than by a legislature. According to Du Plessis (2002:28-
29), the Constitutional Court’s judgments are “not cast aside as matters of dry law, 
settling technical disputes. Rather, they have the potential to stimulate debate and 
reflection, and to draw praise and criticism, becoming part of a rich and varied 
dialogue about ongoing moral and political issues within South Africa.”10 Peter 
use of abortion as contraception even in the last trimester of pregnancy cannot be declared unconsti-
tutional”. Surely it cannot be that the South African Constitution allows for this type of practice.
9 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC): 866 E-G.
10 Charles Ngwena (1998:57-58) also states that the CLA-judgment fell short of a comprehensive 
enumeration of rights to abortion under the Constitution and that: “The task is one that can only be 
authoritatively discharged when the court with ultimate jurisdiction in constitutional matters, the Con-
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Russell (1995:146) states that it is especially in matters concerning pornography, 
prostitution, restrictions on Sunday shopping, the death penalty, cloning and abor-
tion where judicialisation should best be understood, not as transferring decision-
making authority from one branch of government to another, but rather as judicial 
processing of social controversy. The importance of the judiciary in such “socially 
controversial” issues is further explained against the background of the “balancing 
of interests” jurisprudence.11 In this regard, Alexander Aleinikoff (1987:984) states 
that the judiciary improves the balancing process by giving weight to interests that 
the legislature tends to ignore or undervalue. This is more specifically explained in 
that the judiciary’s application of the balancing exercise reinforces representation, 
hereby ensuring that the interests of unpopular or underrepresented groups are 
accommodated (and accommodated fairly).12
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Stewart v� Botha13 stated that “… it should 
not be asked of the law to answer the question as to whether or not a ‘particular 
child should have been born at all’ as this ‘goes so deeply to the heart of what it 
is to be human.’” In this regard, Sonia Human and Lize Mills (2010:88) comment 
that it should be the duty of the courts to answer the most difficult questions�14 
This implies also that the Constitutional Court will have to explain why the unborn 
stitutional Court, is seized of the matter”.
11 By such “balancing“ is meant the theories of constitutional interpretation that are based on the 
identification, valuation, and comparison of competing interests (Aleinikoff 1987:945). Aleinikoff 
(1987:946) further explains that the “balancing metaphor” takes the form of where the Court talks 
about one interest outweighing another or where, according to the Court, one interest does not overri-
de another – each survives and is given its due.
12 Aleinikoff (1987:1001) adds that: “Balancing may appear inevitable, not because we can’t think in 
non-balancing ways, but because it seems unreasonable not to take all the relevant interests into 
account in deciding an important question.” See what John Hart Ely (1973:933-934) states regarding 
the importance of the judiciary regarding the interests of the foetus: “In his famous Carolene Products 
footnote, Justice Stone suggested that the interests to which the Court can responsibly give extraor-
dinary constitutional protection include not only those expressed in the Constitution but also those 
that are unlikely to receive adequate consideration in the political process, specifically the interests 
of “discrete and insular minorities” unable to form effective political alliances … Compared with men, 
very few women sit in our legislatures … But no fetuses sit in our legislatures. Of course they have their 
champions, but so have women. The two interests have clashed repeatedly in the political arena, and 
have continued to do so…”
13 2008 6 SA 310 (SCA). 
14 (Author’s emphasis). Also see Naudé 1999:551; Fuller1978:366-367; and Aulis1986:198. Similarly, 
the South African High Court in S v. Mshumpa (2008 1 SACR 126 [E]), although the court (per Frone-
man) found the State’s argument to be “passionate, eloquent and temptingly persuasive”, it refrained 
from engaging in any substantial evaluation of its merits. According to Rani Pillay (2010:234-235), 
the said court chose instead to adopt a largely pragmatic approach and focused on what it regarded 
as “important impediments” to developing the common law regarding the extending of personhood 
status to the unborn against the background of establishing feticide as a possible crime in South 
Africa.
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is not human or worthy of protection. Similarly, Tjakie Naudé (1999:554), in her 
criticism of the CLA-judgment, states that the Court cannot skip a thorough con-
sideration of the value of life. To do so, says Naudé, would be to choose a radical 
free model of interpretation, without the judge being able to argue convincingly 
how the desired outcome was reached. To ignore efforts at clarifying the legal sta-
tus of the unborn due to the “complexity” and “disparate” views surrounding the 
legal status of the unborn (or due to fears of reflecting insensitivity towards the 
pregnant woman), is simply a weak argument. With special reference to the legal 
status of the unborn, the judiciary has on more than one occasion proclaimed its 
exclusion on matters so complex. The irony is that by avoiding the issue, a decision 
is in fact made which influences perspectives on the unborn.15 Referring to Judge 
McCreath’s view in the CLA-judgment, Denise Meyerson (1999:54) comments that 
Judge McCreath’s suggestion that the plaintiffs might have raised a different cause of 
action from the one they did is not in the least convincing. The judge, according to 
Meyerson (1999:54), suggested that the plaintiffs, instead of framing their cause of 
action in “absolute terms”, might have argued that the rights of the woman and that 
of the unborn compete and that the “Choice Act” does not provide the right balance 
between the unborn’s right to life and the woman’s right to liberty. This statement, 
says Meyerson (1999:54), makes no sense. Either section 11 confers a right to life 
on the unborn or it does not.
Here it is important to emphasize the role of civil society, especially those reli-
gious institutions that have an interest in the protection of the unborn, in taking the 
matter to the Constitutional Court or in becoming involved in the Court proceedings 
in other ways, for example as amicus curiae. Access to the Constitutional Court is 
provided for in the Constitutional Court Rules, which permit a person with an inter-
est in a matter before the Constitutional Court and who is not a party in the matter 
to be admitted as an amicus curiae (De Waal et al 2001:119). An amicus curiae 
assists the court by providing information or argument (usually by means of written 
submissions but also via oral submissions) concerning questions relating to law or 
fact. The amicus can have an interest in the case at hand (or can be a source of 
expertise on the matter relevant to the case being addressed), and can enter the 
proceedings either voluntarily or be requested by the court to urge a particular po-
sition. This allows organised civil society (for example the churches) to intervene 
in a case and present arguments before the court (Jagwanth 2003:15). According 
to Jagwanth (2003:16), public interest litigation and intervention in courts by or-
15 Rani Pillay (2010:234) refers to the CLA-judgment as having relinquished a valuable opportunity to 
engage with the interpretation and development of whether an unborn child is a legal persona under 
the common law and adds that the same opportunity again presented itself in S v. Mshumpa (2008 1 
SACR 126 (E).
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ganised civil society has resulted in tremendous victories for disadvantaged groups 
in other parts of the world.
From the above, the argument is therefore made that the judiciary in general, 
and the highest domestic human rights courts specifically, have, in a democratic 
and rule of law dispensation, a constructive and developmental role to play regard-
ing complex yet foundational human rights questions such as that related to the 
legal status of the unborn. Civil society, especially religious associations, also have 
a role to play in this. To assist in this regard, the role of science and the idea of the 
unborn as, at best, something human, and at worst, something so closely resem-
bling humanity that it should be awarded some or other protection, are argued for 
in the next section.
Towards establishing the value of the unborn3. 
Questions as to the legal status of the unborn surely necessitate some enquiry as to 
what it means to be human� If an important end of the law is the human being, and 
if it is critical for our understanding of human rights law to see how it can protect 
the individual, then it is also important to address the legal status of the unborn. 
This gains in importance when one bears in mind that the debate on the nature of 
the unborn has not quietened down, and has, in fact, intensified. In addition, ad-
vances in medical science and technology have had a profound impact on the areas 
of human reproduction, pregnancy and foetology, which in turn, has transformed 
the understanding of the unborn to that of an individual with a separate genetic 
identity from that of its mother (Pillay 2010:237).
In Roe v� Wade16, the American Supreme Court was presented with briefs describing 
foetal development and containing photographs of the unborn. Nevertheless, all the 
Justices remained silent on the issue as to the actual characteristics of the unborn. 
The nearest they came to discussion on this was their consideration of the “viability 
factor”, which is in essence a relational characteristic (rather than a characteristic 
primarily of the nature of the foetus). Similarly Judge McCreath in the CLA-judg-
ment argued that medical evidence was irrelevant.17 Regarding the CLA-judgment, 
16 410 U.S. 113 (1973). S.J. Frankowski (1987:23-24) comments that the Roe-decision was revolutio-
nary for many reasons, one of them being that for all practical purposes, abortion on demand sudden-
ly became a matter of constitutional right.
17 In this regard, Judge McCreath in the CLA-judgment (1118 B-D) stated: “The plaintiffs’ cause of ac-
tion, founded, as it is, solely on s 11 of the Constitution, is therefore dependent for its validity on the 
question whether ‘everyone’ or ‘every person’ applies to the foetus ‘from the moment of the child’s 
conception’. The answer hereto does not depend on medical or scientific evidence as to when the life 
of a human being commences and the subsequent development of the foetus up to date of birth.” 
Naudé (1999:553) criticises Judge McCreath’s reliance on the Canadian case of Tremblay v. Daigle so 
as to support the view that medical evidence is irrelevant. In fact, Naudé states that the said Canadian 
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Tjakie Naudé (1999:553) questions whether section 12(2)(a) of the South African 
Constitution was intended to allow for abortions even in the period of pregnancy 
immediately preceding birth. Could this well be the case? If this was the intention, 
says Naudé, then it can be argued that the state may pay women to have abortions in 
order to ensure a ready supply of cadaver foetal brain tissue to be used in the treat-
ment of disease.18 Having brought this to our attention, Naudé (1999:553) comes 
to the conclusion that section 12(2)(a) does not create a constitutional right to 
have an abortion on demand up to just before birth, and once a court accepts this 
view, medical evidence would be relevant for establishing the stages of foetal 
development involved�19
Rani Pillay (2010:238) comments that whatever the reasons for judges’ reluctance 
to take into consideration advances in medical science and technology in interpret-
ing and applying the law, it is clear that their approach to the beginning of human 
personhood is incompatible with the imperative that law be impartial, relevant and 
dynamic. The judiciary must make a point of choosing its language carefully so as 
to be sensitive towards the issue in general. In this regard, the European Court of 
Human Rights in the recent case of Vo v. France20 stated (as per majority judg-
ment): “they [human embryos] are beginning to receive some protection in the 
light of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic 
engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation” (Joseph 
2009:211). Jozef Dorscheidt (2010:444) observes that in 2006 the District Court 
of Amsterdam concluded that in an advanced pregnancy of twenty-seven weeks, 
the unborn child had to be regarded as “another person” under the Compulsory 
Admissions in Psychiatric Hospitals Act. In this regard, it was acknowledged that 
the unborn child was capable of experiencing danger within the meaning of the law, 
which was believed to justify the authorisation of a compulsory measure in this case 
– an acknowledgment that according to Dorscheidt was “quite a break-through”. 
It will be difficult to exclude a scientific analysis of foetal development, hereby as-
sisting what Justice Cameron refers to as “that quality of open-minded readings to 
persuasion without unfitting adherence to either party or to the Judge’s own pre-
dilections, preconceptions and personal views – that is the keystone of a civilised 
system of adjudication. Impartiality requires, in short, a mind, open to persuasion 
judgment did not categorically exclude the relevance of science.
18 Here Naudé is referring to a situation sketched by Denise Meyerson.
19 Naudé (1999:553) adds that: “As a court must consider s 12(2)(a) for its interpretation of s 11, it 
should therefore be prepared to admit medical evidence when it considers s 11, although such evi-
dence would not necessarily be decisive.”
20 App. No. 53924/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., 8 July 2004.
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by the evidence and the submissions of counsel …”21 This undoubtedly implies the 
relevance of science in the determination of the legal status of the unborn.
David Bilchitz (2009:52) states that a related and central principle of the new 
constitutional order in South Africa is that the interests of the most vulnerable in 
our society must be protected. Taking the meaning of the “most vulnerable in our 
society” a step further in his analysis of the ‘”legal personhood and dignity of non-
human animals”, Bilchitz (2009:52) asks: “Why is it that we should value all and 
only human beings and only confer on them rights to decent treatment?” Bilchitz is 
implying here the need for considering the interests of animals. However, the ques-
tion that Bilchitz presents can also be applied to the human foetus.
Bilchitz adds that, although section 8(4) of the South African Constitution pro-
vides that a juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights (to the 
extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of the juristic person), 
there is no similar provision in relation to natural persons. In this regard, Bilchitz 
(2009:67) states:
It would be absurd, however, to suggest that the Bill of Rights was only designed to 
protect the interests of juristic persons and there are other clear textual pointers 
against such an interpretation. Perhaps it was too obvious to include in the ap-
plication clause but the rights of natural persons must, by necessary implication, 
be protected by the Bill of Rights. The extension of the category of natural persons 
thus becomes crucial in determining who is entitled to the protection of the Bill 
of Rights.
May such an extension of the category of natural persons not include the unborn? If 
it is proposed for animals then why not for the unborn? In commenting on Martha 
Nussbaum’s notion of dignity and capabilities, which is attractive in that it inculcates 
respect for each form of life that exists and requires us to treat each being ac-
cording to the standards appropriate for its flourishing (Bilchitz 2009:64), Bilchitz 
(2009:65) states: “It attempts to move away from arbitrary exclusions (something 
that has characterised South Africa’s past) to embrace all beings capable of flour-
ishing. It also seeks to respect the variable goods of different beings, reflecting the 
distinctiveness and individuality of each.” Bearing Bilchitz’s observations in mind, is 
there any reason why the protection of the unborn may not be seriously considered? 
Even if the unborn is not perceived as human, “it” should at least enjoy some sen-
sitivity from the law. Coleman (1984:17) argues that if dogs and post offices, which 
21 SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v. Irvin and Johnson Ltd (Seafood Division Fish 
Processing) 2000 8 BCLR 886 CC 893 (this is a judgment of the South African Constitutional Court).
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are not persons and do not bear constitutional rights, enjoy protection, all the more 
reason for the protection of the interests of the unborn.
The ever-growing relevance of science to the abortion debate, and the under-
standing that the unborn represents an entity that has intrinsic value worthy of pro-
tection, should assist in supporting the South African Constitutional Court in coming 
to a finding that recognises the protection of the unborn to some or other degree.
Conclusion4. 
Whether the whole or a part of the Choice on the Termination of Pregnancy Act 
be presented to the Constitutional Court for a decision that it violates the right to 
life (or that the unborn requires some or other protection more than current South 
African legislation permits), it will be expected of the Court to refrain from making 
findings from which it is portrayed that “it is not the responsibility of the Court to 
make findings on matters so complex and contentious.” What is hinted at here is an 
approach with the character of, for example, the German judiciary, where it found 
that “the state had a primary duty to protect human life, even before birth. This duty, 
which begins at conception, related to every individual life and included a duty also 
to protect the unborn child against the mother” (Chaskalson et al 1996:16-5). This 
did not exclude protection of the pregnant woman’s rights, in that it was decided 
that where a woman insisted on having an abortion after she had been subjected to 
counselling designed to persuade her to carry the unborn to term, and the abortion 
was performed within a legislatively defined period, such an abortion need not be a 
criminal offence. Nevertheless, the illegal abortion could never be justified consti-
tutionally because of the duty of the state to protect unborn life. The majority drew 
no distinction between pre- and post-natal life (Chaskalson et al 1996:16-5–16-6). 
The Court decided that the unborn is a bearer of constitutional rights from concep-
tion (Chaskalson et al 1996:16-6).22
The South African Constitutional Court needs to transcend the findings of “clas-
sical” judgments qualifying so-called unlimited access to abortions. In this regard, 
Tjakie Naudé (1999:549), commenting on the CLA-judgment, states:
The US Supreme Court decision in Roe v� Wade involved a challenge by a woman 
against prohibitive legislation regarding abortion and that it is not therefore of 
much assistance to the question regarding whether there is any ground on which 
22 For more on this see Kommers, Donald P. 1977. Abortion and Constitution: United States and West 
Germany. The American Journal of Comparative Law 25(2): 255-285. This is basically the stance the 
German Court maintained in both of its major decisions pertaining to abortion jurisprudence handed 
down in 1975 and 1993 (in 1975, it was the West German Federal Constitutional Court and after 
Germany’s reunification it was Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court).
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permissive abortion legislation may be challenged on the basis that foetal life must 
be protected. The Court did not examine the subsequent controversy surrounding 
Roe, being content that that controversy did not affect the finding that the foetus 
is not a person.
Naudé (1999:556) adds that, if the judiciary is not allowed to review legislation 
such as the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, the state could freely allow 
the termination on demand of a form of biological life with a clear connection to 
born human life (and which looks very much like born human life at some stage) 
without the judiciary being able to declare such legislation unconstitutional. The 
high regard for human life which the Constitution displays, says Naudé, would then 
be endangered so that the right to life itself would be threatened. Taking into ac-
count South Africa’s transformation into a nation aspiring towards the advance-
ment of human rights and freedoms,23 there should be informative, impartial and 
constructive discourse on the legal status of the unborn, and in this regard, the 
Constitutional Court needs to play its expected role, together with those sectors of 
civil society, such as religious associations.
References
Aleinikoff, Alexander T. 1987. Constitutional law in the age of balancing. The Yale Law Jour-
nal 96(5):943-1005.
Bilchitz, David. 2009. Moving beyond arbitrariness: The legal personhood and dignity of 
non-human animals. South African Journal for Human Rights 25(1):38-72.
Botha, Henk. 2009. Human dignity in comparative perspective. Stellenbosch Law Review 
20(2):171-220.
Chaskalson, M., Kentridge, J., Klaaren, J., Marcus, G., Spitz, D., Woolman, S. 1996. Consti-
tutional law of South Africa. Kenwyn: Juta.
Coleman III, J.J. 1984. Roe v. Wade: A retrospective look at a judicial oxymoron. Saint 
Louis University Law Journal 29(7):7-44.
De Waal, J., Currie, I., Erasmus, G. (eds). 2001. The Bill of Rights handbook. 4th edition, 
Lansdowne: Juta.
Dellapenna, Joseph W. 2006. Dispelling the myths of abortion history. Durham, North 
Carolina: Carolina Academic Press.
Dorscheidt, Jozef H.H.M. 2010. Developments in legal and medical practice regarding the 
unborn child and the need to expand prenatal legal protection. European Journal of 
Health Law 17(5):433-454.
Du Plessis, M. 2002. Between apology and Utopia – the Constitutional Court and public 
opinion. South African Journal of Human Rights 18(1):1-40.
23 Section 1 (a) of the South African Constitution, 1996.
The South African Constitutional Court and the unborn  61
Ely, John Hart. 1973. The wages of crying wolf: A comment on Roe v� Wade� Yale Law Jour-
nal 82:920-949.
Frankowski, S.J. 1987. United States of America, in S.J. Frankowski and G.F. Cole (eds). 
Abortion and protection of the human fetus� Legal problems in a cross-cultural 
perspective� Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 17-74.
Human, Sonia and Mills, Lize. 2010. The immeasurable wrongfulness of being: The denial of 
the claim for wrongful life. Stellenbosch Law Review 21(1):67-89.
Jagwanth, S. 2003. Management of social transformations. Discussion Paper 65, De-
mocracy, Civil Society and the South African Constitution: Some Challenges. Paris: 
UNESCO.
Joseph, Rita. 2009. Human rights and the unborn child. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
Meyerson, D. 1999. Abortion: the constitutional issues. South African Law Journal 
116(1):50-59.
Naudé, Tjakie. 1999. The value of life. A note on Christian Lawyers Association of SA v� 
Minister of Health� South African Journal of Human Rights15(4):541-563.
Ngwena, Charles. 1998. The history and transformation of abortion law in South Africa. Acta 
Academica 30(3):32-68.
Perry, Michael J. 2007. Toward a theory of human rights� Religion, law, courts� Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pillay, Rani. 2010. The beginning of human personhood: Is South African law outdated? Stel-
lenbosch Law Review 2(2010):230-238.
Russell, Peter H. 1995. Canadian constraints on judicialization from without, in C. Neal Tate 
and Torbjörn Vallinder (eds.). The global expansion of judicial power. New York 
and London: New York University Press, 137-150.
Smyth, John. 2006. Moving towards improvement in SA abortion legislation. Journal for 
Christian Scholarship 42 (Special Issue 2):223-239.
